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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Appellees accept Appellants' statement of jurisdiction as accurate.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is "mutual mistake" a proper basis for equitable recision of a contract?
Standard of Review: This is a question of law that is subject to de novo

review. Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990)
2.

Were the findings of fact made by the trial court clearly erroneous, in light

of the evidence presented at trial?
Standard of Review: Issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a trial court's factual findings and the adequacy of those findings are
reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. All
Real Property. 37 P.3d 276, 278 (Utah App. 2001)
3.

Did the trial court properly address and rule upon all the material issues of

fact that were presented in the case?
Standard of Review: Issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a trial court's factual findings and the adequacy of those findings are
reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. All
Real Property. 37 P.3d 276, 278 (Utah App. 2001)
1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are not statutory provisions that are determinative of the issues in this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
This case was commenced by the filing of a Complaint by Kendall
InsuMiii t! 11K ' il 111 h'v Aiiii Morgan,

(hereinafter collectively

referred to as "Morgans") on February 24, 2004. On March 24, 2004, R&R Group
and Rick Stanzione (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sellers") filed their
Answt'i ,iii(l (iiiiinlt'ii.knin

I

oceeding, Sellers pursued

orders to show cause in April 2004, and in April 2005. An order relating to
proceedings on the first order to show cause was entered on August 9, 2004.
Issues raise

v cause were merged with all other

I

issues and considered by the court at a trial conducted on October 31 and
November 1,2005.
owing the trial, .

iciings of hau .

conclusions of

Law, and also its Final Order and Judgment herein on February 27, 2006. On

2

May 26, 2006, Sellers filed their Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. By its Memorandum Decision dated
August 2, 2006, the trial court denied the motion.
Statement of Facts
This case involves a contract for the sale of an insurance agency "book of
business", which sale was negotiated between Morgans, as purchasers, and
Sellers, as sellers, and memorialized by a written contract dated on or about
August 26, 2003. (Record at 30). During the negotiations leading up to the
execution of the contract, Sellers made representations to Morgans regarding the
number and nature of ongoing clients and insurance policies which were being
serviced by the business, and also relating to the value of the "book of business"
which was purportedly being transferred by the contract. (Trial Transcript at 35
and 39-40). The particular book of business which was the subject of the
negotiations was the book of business of the Kendall Insurance Agency, which
business had been acquired by Sellers approximately seventeen months earlier.
(Trial Transcript at 337).
At the time the Kendall Insurance Agency was originally acquired by
Sellers, all records and accounting information of the agency were maintained in
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the form of non-automated paper records, ledgers, etc. (Trial Transcript at 32).
Between the time of Sellers' original acquisition of the Kendall Insurance Agency
and the negotiated transfer to Morgans, Sellers had undertaken the process of
converting all records and accounting information of the agency to an automated
format. (Trial Transcript at 38-39 and 334-336). During the period of negotiation
of the contract, Sellers represented that the conversion of the agency records to
an automated format had been completed, and that the summarized business
and accounting information provided by Sellers to Morgans during the negotiation
of the contract were accurate. (Trial Transcript at 39).
In fact, at the time of the contract, the automation of the agency business
records and accounting information had not been completed, and the information
provided by Sellers to Morgans did not accurately reflect either the nature or
value of the book of business being transferred. (Trial Transcript at 48-50 and 7374). Upon execution of the contract, Morgans paid their initial down payment of
at least $75,000 toward the purchase price. (Trial Transcript at 127-128 and Trial
Exhibits 12 and 13). Thereafter Morgans made additional advances to the
business in amounts in excess of $42,000.00. (Trial Exhibits 12 and 13).
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Shortly after undertaking operation of the insurance agency, Morgans
discovered significant discrepancies between the information they had received
and the actual customers and policies which were being serviced by the agency.
(Trial Transcript at 48-50 and 73-74J. The magnitude of the errors in the
information was that approximately forty to fifty percent of the customers and
policies which were reflected in the business records received by Morgans were
not accurate and had been either discontinued or otherwise terminated. (Trial
Transcript at 49 and 73-74).
Upon discovering the significant discrepancies in the business information,
Morgans requested a reformation of the contract. (Trial Transcript at 128). This
request was denied by Sellers. (Trial Transcript at 128 and 130). As a result of
such denial, the present complaint was filed by Morgans in February 2004.
(Record at 1). In their response to the complaint, Sellers asserted several
alternative defenses, including an affirmative request for return of the insurance
agency to Sellers. (Record at 22 and 27). Thereafter, in April 2004, after an
attempted self-help recovery of the business by Sellers was unsuccessful, Sellers
sought and obtained an order to show cause, the focus of which was an effort by
Sellers to obtain complete control over the disputed insurance agency and its

5

assets. (Record at 46). At the conclusion of the hearing on the order to show
cause, the court ruled that the agency and its assets should be returned to the
control of Sellers, which ruling was memorialized in the court's formal order
entered on or about August 9, 2004. (Record at 101).
Following entry of the court's order on August 9, 2004, Morgans took steps
to return to Sellers all assets and information relating to the originally- transferred
insurance agency. (Trial Transcript at 102-108). At the same time, Morgans
attempted to maintain their own independent agency based upon clients and
policies which were not associated with the Kendall Insurance Agency being
returned to Sellers. (Trial Transcript at 121-122). Disputes over the return of
Kendall Insurance Agency information and assets continued from August 2004
through approximately April 2005, at which time Sellers sought a second order to
show cause relating to the return of the agency information. (Record at 125).
As indicated in the procedural history, above, issues raised in this second
Order to Show Cause were merged with all trial issues and tried before the court
on October 31 and November 1, 2005. Both parties acknowledge that the
continuing disputes had a negative impact on the value of the insurance agency
book of business that was the subject of the original contract.

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The essence of the present appeal is Sellers' dissatisfaction with the
consequences of a result which they, themselves, sought. The court's ruling that
the underlying contract between the parties should be rescinded is supported by
the trial court's finding of a mutual mistake as to material facts at the time the
contract was negotiated. Controlling case law in the State of Utah recognizes
mutual mistake as a proper basis for equitable recision of a contract, even when
that contract may appear on its face to be an integrated agreement.
Much of the impetus for the trial court's ultimate decision to rescind the
contract, as a matter of equity, was provided by the aggressive efforts of Sellers,
themselves, to recover and control the insurance agency business and its assets.
Sellers were ultimately successful, through the court's recision order, in regaining
ownership and control of the insurance agency book of business and related
assets. However, Sellers are dissatisfied with the result to the extent that it also
places Morgans, as nearly as possible, into their pre-contract position by
requiring the return of $75,000 of the payments made by Morgans to Sellers at
the initiation of the contract.
Accordingly, Sellers challenge the adequacy of the trial court's findings that
support the equitable recision result. While acknowledging that a challenge to
7

the trial court's factual findings must be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" or
"abuse of discretion" standard, Sellers fail to meet that standard. Rather than
marshaling all of the available evidence which may support the court's findings
and then analyzing that evidence to demonstrate flaws in the court's analysis,
Sellers cite only those portions of the factual record which support an alternative
version of the facts. This method of argument is inappropriate in the present
appeal and fails to meet Sellers' burden in challenging the trial court's findings.
Arguments opposing the court's imposition of limits on the amount of
attorneys fees which may be awarded to Sellers in the case, and additional
challenges to the court's denial of Sellers' request for relief under Rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contain no factual support upon which the
court of appeals could conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in such
determinations. Further, Sellers' failure to timely request the allowance of any
attorneys fees in this case and their similar failure to seek any stay pending
appeal render these issues moot in the present appeal.

8

ARGUMENT
I. RECISION OF THE CONTRACT WAS AN APPROPRIATE RESULT IN
THIS CASE.
A. Mutual Mistake is a Proper Basis for Equitable Recision of a
Contract
The initial argument made in Sellers' brief, at pages 10 through 12, is that
"mutual mistake" cannot, as a matter of law, support the equitable recision of an
integrated contract. Sellers' references to the case of Maack v. Resource Design
& Construction. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994), are not correct in their
suggestion that only "positive fraud" can support the equitable recision of an
integrated contract. The court's analysis in the Maack case includes a discussion
of the parole evidence rule as it relates to the admissibility of evidence relating to
contract formation issues, and quotes the Utah Supreme Court decision of Union
Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), as follows:
The parole evidence rule as a principle of contract
interpretation has a very narrow application. Simply stated, the rule
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude contemporaneous
conversations, statements, or representations offered for the
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract..
This general rule as stated contains an exception for fraud.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which
the contract was made or the purpose for which the writing was
executed. This is so even after the writing is determined to be an
integrated contract. Admitting parol evidence in such circumstances
9

avoids the judicial enforcement of a writing that appears to be a
binding integration but in fact is not.
"What appears to be a complete and binding integrated
agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an agreement
without consideration, or it may be voidable for fraud, duress,
mistake, or the like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidation causes
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the writing."
Maack v. Resource Design. 875 P. 2d at 575, quoting from Union Bank v.
Swenson. 707 P. 2d at 665 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt.
c(1981)).
Recision of a contract is an equitable remedy, the effect of which is to
return both parties to the contract, as nearly as possible, to the positions they
were in prior to the execution of the purported contract. Perry v. Woodall. 438
P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968). The ruling of the court in the present case, that the
contract at issue should be equitably rescinded as a result of a mutual mistake of
fact relating to the nature and value of the underlying insurance agency book of
business, is consistent with the decision of courts in this state which have
addressed the issue of equitable recision. "A mutual mistake occurs when both
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic
assumption or vital fact upon which they base their bargain." Robert Langston.
Ltd. v. McQuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1987). "Mutual mistake of fact
makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable recision." ]o\ (citing
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Tanner v. District Judges. 649 P. 2d 5, 6 (Utah 1982); Tarrant v. Monson. 619 P.
2d 1210, 1211 (Nev. 1980)).
In the present case, as properly found by the district court, the parties
shared a misconception as to the nature and value of the book of business which
was the subject of the purchase contract. The misconception related directly to
the valuation of the book of business, and was confirmed by evidence presented
to the court, including testimony which indicated that the financial and business
records of the company were undergoing a process of automation that rendered
the reports relied upon during the contract negotiations grossly inaccurate.
Shortly after the Morgans undertook operation of the insurance agency, they
discovered the significant inaccuracies in the books and records which had been
provided to them, and ultimately determined that the book of business which they
received was substantially less, both in size and value, than was contemplated by
both parties at the time the contract was entered into.
B. Effective Recision of the Contract was Sought by Sellers
At the inception of the litigation, and consistently throughout the
proceedings in the trial court, Sellers aggressively asserted the right to recover
and control the business operations and assets of the agency which had
purportedly been sold. These efforts, which included an affirmative request in
11

Appellant's counterclaim for recovery of the business, and also two orders to
show cause whereby Sellers sought to recover complete control over the
business and its assets, are consistent with a recision of the contract, but are not
consistent with the presently-stated desire of Sellers to enforce the terms of the
contract, as written.
Sellers' dissatisfaction with the result ordered by the court, and particularly
the refunding to Morgans of the initial purchase price paid toward the acquisition
of the book of business, is based more upon a misunderstanding of the effect of a
recision than it is on any suggestion that Sellers did not seek a recision of the
contract in this case.
Contrary to the position maintained by Sellers throughout the litigation, the
argument contained in their present brief is that "this Court should grant
Stanzione's request for relief below by enforcing the contractual terms requiring
the Morgans to finish making payments for Kendall Insurance and by requiring
Stanzione to return Kendall Insurance to the Morgans." (see Appellant's Opening
Brief at page 12). By advancing, on appeal, the position that the court should
now require Sellers to return ownership and control of the insurance agency to
Morgans, Sellers are attempting to disavow the principal positions maintained in
the trial court. This can be explained by Sellers' present realization that the

12

recision which they sought did not provide the financial result which they had
hoped for.
C. The Court's Findings and Conclusions are Sufficient to Support
Recision of the Contract
As set forth in Robert Lanqston Ltd. v. McQuarrie. the existence of a
mutual mistake of fact makes a contract voidable, and is sufficient to support
equitable recision. 741 P2d. at 557. In its findings and conclusions herein, the
trial court did specifically find a mutual mistake of fact, which finding has factual
support in the record, thereby providing a sufficient basis for the equitable
recision ordered. Defendant does not dispute that a finding of "mutual mistake"
was made, but challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support that finding,
which challenge will be addressed further, below.
D. The Award of a Money Judgment to Morgans and Recovery and
Retention of the Business by Sellers are Consistent with Recision.
When the remedy of equitable recision is applied, the further role of the
court is to craft the specific remedial steps that should be taken to return the
parties, as nearly as possible, to the position that they were in before the contract
was entered into. ]a\ In the present case the court appropriately, and consistent
with Sellers' requests, returned to Sellers all assets and business operations
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relating to the subject book of business. This effectively returned Sellers to the
position they were in prior to execution of the contract.
In order to return Morgans, as nearly as possible, to the position they were
in prior to the execution of the contract, and consistent with Robert Lanqston Ltd.
v. McQuarrie. the court required that $75,000.00 from the original down payment
paid by Morgans be returned to them. It is significant that Sellers have not
challenged the court's determination of the amount to be repaid to Morgans but,
instead, only argue that the consequence of recision of the contract which
requires repayment to Morgans is not a proper result.
II. SELLERS' CHALLENGES TO THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE NOT
PROPERLY SUPPORTED.
A. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard of Review with Respect to
Challenged Findings of Fact Has Not Been Met.
Throughout their opening brief, Sellers take issue with the findings of the
trial court. While acknowledging that the appellate standard for review of factual
findings made by a trial court is a very high "abuse of discretion" or "clearly
erroneous" standard, the substance of Sellers' argument goes only so far as to
suggest that the evidence presented during the trial in this matter may, if viewed
differently and given different weight by the trial court, have justified a different
conclusion. Sellers are essentially arguing that the appellate court should review
14

the evidence itself, particularly the evidence which is more favorable to the
Sellers' position, and reverse the trial court's findings based upon that review.
This is not the role or function of an appellate court, and is inconsistent with the
requirement that, on appeal, the findings of the trial court should not be modified
or reversed absent a showing of "abuse of discretion." State v. All Real Property.
37 P. 3d at 278.
Much of Sellers' argument is based upon the testimony of David Kano, and
the suggestion that such testimony confirms that the book of business did have
the value represented by Sellers. Mr. Kano's testimony, however, carries little
weight in the overall analysis of the case as a result of several factors, all of
which are confirmed in the trial record. These factors include the absence of any
independent verification by Mr. Kano of the sources of the funds that were
reflected on the statements he reviewed (Trial Transcript at 278-279 and 281282), the inclusion of significant premium payments that were generated by
Morgans entirely independent of the Kendall Insurance book of business (Trial
Transcript at 72, 130, and 161), the inclusion of funds advanced by Morgans to
the insurance agency to cover operating shortfalls (Trial Exhibits 12 and 13), and
the contribution of Paul Nelson's independent book of business into the agency
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(Trial Transcript at 43). In light of these factors, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by giving little weight to Mr. Kano's testimony.
B. Sellers have Failed to Marshal the Evidence Sufficiently to
Challenge the Findings of the Trial Court
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, "A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Sellers have failed to marshal the fact evidence which
supports the position they are challenging. The burden of proof lies with the party
appealing the lower court decision. The challenging party must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the contested findings and show that despite the supporting
facts and in light of the conflicting contradictory evidence the decision of the trial
court is clearly erroneous. The Utah Court of Appeals has previously held that:
Successful challenges to findings of fact thus must demonstrate to
appellate courts first how the trial court found the facts from the
evidence and second why such findings contradict the weight of the
evidence.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053
(Utah App. 1994). In describing the responsibility of the challenger the court
noted:
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence,
the challenger must present in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
16

the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding
resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. (Emphasis added.)
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.
1991). Sellers have failed to marshal the evidence in accordance with these
decisions.
III. THE COURT'S RULING PROPERLY ADDRESSES AND DISPOSES
OF ALL FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.
Contrary to Sellers' suggestions, the findings made by the trial court in this
matter are sufficient in every respect. The fact that the court did not rule
favorably on Sellers' requests for a finding of contempt and other sanctions, does
not mean that the court failed to rule on the issues upon which such requests
were based. The responsibility of the trial court is to make findings on the
ultimate facts. "It is not necessary to make findings on the subsidiary or
evidentiary facts." Duncan v. Hemmelwriqht. 186 P.2d 965, 112 Utah 262, 265
(1947). The merger of the order to show cause into the trial issues rendered the
order to show cause subsidiary to the overarching trial issues. Even so, the
underlying issues which were the subject of the final order to show cause whether or not Morgans had returned the book of business and related assets to
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Sellers, and whether Morgans had, by their actions and business conduct,
attempted to circumvent the court's earlier order in a manner sufficient to support
a finding of contempt - were specifically dealt with in the trial court findings.
The specific findings made by the court which address these issues include
the following:
19. In his steps to reclaim the assets and operations of the Kendall
Insurance Agency in 2004, Stanzione acted in a controlling an
compulsive manner.
* * *

21. Through a motion filed with this court, Defendants' sought to
obtain possession and operational control of the Kendall Agency and
its assets. A hearing on Defendants' motion was conducted in late
June 2004, at which time the court ordered the operational control of
the Kendall Agency be returned to Defendants. The formal court
order directing the return of the Kendall Agency to Defendants was
entered in the above-entitled court on or about August 9, 2004.
* * *

23. The actions of both Plaintiffs and Defendants, including their
communications with third parties, clients, and insurance agencies,
were detrimental to and impaired the relationships which had been
established previously through the operations of the Kendall Agency.
24. All assets of the Kendall Agency have been returned and are
presently controlled by Defendants.
* * *

26. The operations of the Kendall Agency have been terminated as
a result of the incorporation of that business into the business of the
R&R Group under the management of Stanzione."

18

Findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the court herein and dated
February 27, 2006, and included in Appellant's addendum of exhibits filed
concurrently with Appellant's opening brief.
The foregoing findings confirm both the actual return of the assets to Sellers
and the mutual responsibility of both parties for confusion and negative impact
upon the value of those assets. Such findings are entirely consistent with the
court's not granting any additional relief based upon the order to show cause
previously obtained at Sellers' request.
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES ARE MOOT.
In their arguments on appeal, Sellers allege error in the limitations imposed
by the trial court on attorneys fees awarded to Sellers. This argument, however,
must be overruled as a result of Sellers' failure to seek any award of attorneys
fees in this case. In its ruling, the court specifically authorized an award of
attorneys fees, but required that an application for such fees be submitted to the
court, and subject to review and challenge by Morgans, within ten days after entry
of the court's original order. While it is true that the court's order also imposes a
limit on the attorneys fees which may be awarded to the sum of $17,500.00, no
amount has ever actually been requested or awarded to Sellers consistent with
the order of the trial court. Having failed to request an allowance of any fees,
19

Sellers have waived the right to recover such fees in this action, thereby rendering
moot any question relating to such award of fees in the present appeal.
V. ARGUMENTS REGARDING DENIAL OF THE RULE 60(b) MOTION
ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Following entry of the court's final order and judgment in this case, Sellers
filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 (b), which motion was ultimately denied by the
court. Because Sellers' motion sought only procedural protection from the
enforcement of the final judgment and order, it does not constitute a final and
appealable order in the present case. Simply put, Sellers have not taken
appropriate procedural steps to seek further protection from the enforcability of the
court's judgment pending the outcome of the present appeal. Further, pursuing an
appeal from the denial of such motion has no effect on the enforcability of the
judgment, and also does nothing to change or enhance the arguments or positions
which have otherwise been presented to the court for appellate review.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court in the present
case were based upon sufficient evidence, and were correctly applied to support
the court's determinations that the contract between the parties be rescinded, and
that a money judgment for return of the down payment be awarded to Morgans.
Appellant's arguments relating to the limitation on any award of attorney fees have
been rendered moot by Appellant's failure to seek allowance of any fees within the
time period specified by the court. The decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.
DATED this _ ^ ^ d a y of December, 2006.

Noel S.Hyde
Attorney for Morgans
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I hereby certify that on this ^ f ^ a y of December, 2006,1 mailed two true
and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, first-class
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Drew Briney, Esq.
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